The New Brunswick Court of Appeal has dismissed the appeal of Desjardins Financial Security Life Assurance, ruling that a class action commenced by a non-resident is not automatically void and that the residency defect can be cured by adding a resident plaintiff.

However, the Court set aside an order deeming the resident plaintiff as of May 2022 because the parties had not been heard on the issue. The respondents are awarded a single bill of costs of $5,000.

The decision was rendered on October 29, 2026.

A non-resident brings a class action against New Brunswick insurers

Kelly Anne Wood, the respondent on appeal, lives in Prince Edward Island. Injured in August 2020 in an all-terrain vehicle accident in Quispamis, New Brunswick, she is insured by Desjardins under the province's standard policy. The policy entitles her to a weekly income-loss benefit of up to $250.

Desjardins reduced her weekly benefit to $96.34, interpreting the policy as permitting deductions for disability benefits received under the Canada Pension Plan and Employment Insurance. Other insurers in the province appear to share this interpretation.

In May 2022, Ms. Wood filed a notice of action against Desjardins and 13 other insurers licensed in New Brunswick. She alleged breach of contract, on her own behalf and on behalf of a proposed class. Her residence was pleaded and apparent from the claim.

The claim, amended in 2024, proposes a class of people whose income-loss benefits were reduced because they received other disability benefits. The class has not been certified.

In response to the defendants' objections about Ms. Wood's residence, Paula Joanne Sirois, a New Brunswick resident, was added as a plaintiff in April 2024. She had been injured in a July 2020 accident in Grand Falls and had also seen her benefits reduced by her insurer. Her addition was intended to cure the residency defect. The decision allowing her addition was not appealed.

On November 25, 2024, Desjardins applied to have the action declared void. The other defendants appeared as interested parties. The motion judge dismissed that application, as well as Desjardins' application for judgment in its favour. She held that the action was not void and deemed Ms. Sirois a proposed representative plaintiff as of the initial filing on May 2, 2022.

Desjardins argues the residency defect cannot be cured

Desjardins argues that the residency requirement under subsection 3(1) of the Class Proceedings Act is a standing requirement that cannot be cured under section 14. It maintains that Ms. Wood's claim was not a proceeding under the Act, despite what the originating document stated.

Desjardins acknowledges that the personal claims of Ms. Wood and Ms. Sirois are not void. Only the portions advanced on behalf of other persons would be affected. It also admits that Ms. Sirois could be added as a plaintiff, but disputes that this addition serves to cure the residency defect.

The stakes are concrete for the members of the proposed class. If the action were void, they would potentially lose, as of May 2022, the suspension of the one-year limitation period for their claims. They are not parties to the action or to the motion, but the outcome affects them.

Ms. Wood and Ms. Sirois respond that the text establishes no precondition. They point out that the legislature can easily impose one when it wishes. In their view, the word "may" is permissive and contemplates other ways of commencing a class proceeding.

The defendants had originally argued that the residency defect prevented certification, rather than rendering the action void.

Court rejects Desjardins' interpretation of residency requirement

The Court acknowledges that a literal reading of subsections 3(1) and 3(3) suggests that the person seeking certification and appointment as representative plaintiff must reside in New Brunswick. However, reading section 3 as a whole, the Court finds that the requirement is intended to ensure that a certified class proceeding has a representative plaintiff who is both a class member and a New Brunswick resident.

The requirement is neither a threshold criterion nor a standing requirement. The Act also permits the appointment of a non-class member as representative plaintiff when necessary to avoid substantial injustice to the class.

The Court bases its conclusion on three elements:

  • The wording of the Act. An originating document stating that a proceeding is brought under the Act is sufficient for the Act to apply, even if the membership and residency criteria were not met at commencement.
  • The participation of non-residents. The Act allows non-residents to participate in class proceedings and requires subclasses when a class includes both residents and non-residents.
  • The powers under section 14. The Court has broad discretion to correct defects, even before certification, to ensure a fair and expeditious resolution.

The Court sees no reason to treat a residency defect differently from a class-membership defect, allowing one to be cured while declaring the other incurable. It concludes that the residency requirement is not a standing requirement and that commencing a proposed class proceeding through a non-resident plaintiff does not render it void.

The Court confirms that a resident plaintiff may be added or substituted before certification and may then apply for certification. It rejects Desjardins' interpretation, finding no authoritative support for the argument that the initial defect prevents the Act from applying.

Suspension of limitation periods remains unresolved

Desjardins also challenges the order retroactively recognizing Ms. Sirois as a proposed representative plaintiff as of May 2022, arguing that it could suspend limitation periods from that date even though neither party had requested such an order.

The Court agrees that the motion judge should not have made the order without hearing the parties. Neither side had addressed the date from which limitation periods should be suspended.

The Court finds that the failure to hear the parties justifies setting aside the order, although the motion judge had reasons to consider the limitation issue. Both sides were aware that adding Ms. Sirois could affect the suspension of limitation periods as far back as May 2022.

The Court reluctantly sets aside the retroactive order, noting that the limitation issue was clearly on the parties' minds but had not been raised as an alternative argument. It cautions against resolving such issues piecemeal through successive proceedings.

The parties may return to the Court of King's Bench to address the suspension of limitation periods under subsection 41(1) of the Act. The date from which those periods are suspended remains unresolved.